The purpose of this paper is to assess the impact of regulation in the financial performance of the Water and Sewerage companies (WaSCs) in England and Wales when the sample size is extremely limited. We apply a panel index approach across WaSCs over time to decompose unit-specific (temporal) index number based profitability growth as a function of the profitability, productivity, price and quality performance growth achieved by benchmark firms, and the catch-up to the benchmark firm achieved by less productive firms. The results indicated that the steady decline in average price performance, gains in productivity and relatively stable economic profitability after 2000, suggest that Ofwat is now more focused on passing productivity benefits to consumers, and maintaining stable profitability than it was in earlier regulatory periods. This technique is of great interest for regulators to evaluate the effectiveness of regulation and companies to identify the determinants of profit change and improve future performance, even if sample sizes are limited.
Introduction
The water and sewerage industry in England and Wales was privatized in 1989 and before privatization there were 10 Regional Water Authorities responsible for the water and sewerage supply in England and Wales and 29 Statutory Water companies, which were already privatized companies that were only responsible for the supply of water. After 1989, the 10 Regional Water Authorities were privatized and formed the (Ofwat) , which is the economic regulator and sets the price limits for each company every five years, the Environment Agency (EA), which is responsible for pollution control, licensing and regulation of water abstraction, and the Drinking Water Inspectorate (DWI), which is responsible for controlling and monitoring drinking water quality.
There were plenty of studies in the past that used Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) or Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) techniques to measure the productivity performance of the UK water and sewerage industry before and after privatization and evaluate the impact of the regulatory price cap scheme on their financial performance (see Maziotis (2011) for a comprehensive literature review). However, few studies exist that use index number techniques to measure the overall performance (profits, productivity and price performance) of the UK water and sewerage sector. The importance of index numbers lies on the fact that they allow the measurement of the performance of companies when the number of observations is extremely limited. A significant advantage compared to other estimation techniques such as SFA and DEA which require a relatively large number of observations to specify an efficient frontier
The first profit decomposition analysis using index numbers to assess performance measurement in the UK water and sewerage industry was developed by Saal and Parker (2001) , originally introduced by Waters & Tretheway (1999) for the Australian telecommunication industry. Saal and Parker (2001) employed a temporal (over time) Tornqvist index approach to measure the impact of privatization and regulation on productivity (TFP), price performance (TPP) and profitability for WaSCs for the years 1985-2000. The authors concluded that indicated that privatization did not lead to a significant improvement in the overall productivity growth of WaSCs, whereas the tightened 1994/95 price review reduced firm-specific economic profitability but there were not any significant improvements in productivity. Moreover, Saal and Parker's (2001) approach was then developed by Maziotis, Saal and Thanassoulis (2009) and Maziotis (2012a) . The former used a cross sectional (spatial) index number technique to allow for the cross-sectional (spatial) measurement of TFP, regulatory price performance (TPP), and profitability and showed the subsequent comparison of how these cross sectional measures have changed over time. Changes in TFP, TPP and profitability were measured after taking into account the impact of exogenous characteristics such as drinking water and sewerage treatment quality. The latter developed a panel index approach across WaSCs over time to decompose unit-specific (temporal) index number based profitability growth as a function of the profitability, productivity and price performance growth achieved by benchmark firms, and the catch-up to the benchmark firm achieved by less productive firms. However, the author did not take into account the impact of quality in the productivity and price performance measures.
Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to follow Maziotis (2012a) approach and extend it by measuring the impact of exogenous factors on profitability, productivity and price performance measures. As adjustments for quality affect the productivity and price performance measures leaving the measured economic profitability unchanged, the unit-specific profitability growth can be expressed as a function of the unit-specific quality adjusted productivity and quality-adjusted price performance change. This can be further decomposed as a function of the quality adjusted catch-up in productivity, and the quality adjusted productivity growth of the benchmark firm, and the quality adjusted catch-up in price performance, and the quality adjusted price performance growth of the benchmark firm. The inclusion of quality in our analysis allows us to finally decompose unit-specific economic profitability change as a function of the quality unadjusted catch-up in productivity, the catch-up in quality regarding productivity, and the quality-unadjusted productivity and quality performance over time of the benchmark firm, and the quality unadjusted catch-up in price performance, the catch-up in quality regarding price performance, and the price performance and quality growth of the benchmark firm. We illustrate our analytical decomposition of profit change with an empirical application to the regulated English and Welsh water and sewerage industry during the period 1991-
2008.
This paper unfolds as follows. Sections 2 and 3, consider the methodology necessary to apply this approach in a bilateral and multilateral context. The following section provides a discussion of data employed and the next section details the empirical results. Section 6 eventually concludes.
Methodology

Unit specific Profitability, Productivity and Price Performance Indices
Following the approach of Waters & Tretheway (1999) , Saal & Parker (2001) and Maziotis (2012) we first measure profits, productivity and price performance between two time periods, year t and the base year 1 for firm i . Economic profits of firm i at the base year 1, 
Thus, the unit-specific economic profitability index,
can be expressed as a function of an index of unit-specific total factor productivity in period t relative to the base year 1, 
Spatial Profitability, Productivity, and Price Performance Indices
We next consider the relationship between profits, productivity and price performance for firm i relative to a base firm b at time t, which we call a spatial index, thereby adopting the terminology employed in the price index literature (Hill, 2004) .
As a result of its definition, these indices only directly measure differences in performance in the spatial dimension (between firms) at any given time. indices. This decomposition of spatial profitability highlights that, at any given time, observed differences in profitability between firms can be explained by differences in productivity, differences in price performance, or differences in both.
By definition spatial indices estimate firm i's performance relative to any potential base firm b, and can therefore be employed to measure catch up in relative performance. Thus, if we have access to data for the base year 1 and any other year t, we can define and decompose an index of economic profitability catch up for any firm i at time t and relative to the base firm b at period t,
π ,as follows: 
Thus, for firm i at time t, an index of economic profitability catch up, 
) and input prices
). This decomposition of profitability catch up highlights that a firm's catch up in profitability can be explained not only by improving its productivity performance relative to the base firm, but also by improving its price performance relative to the base firm.
Relative Profitability, Productivity and Price Performance Indices
We finally define the relationship between profits, productivity and price performance for any firm i at any time t relative to a base firm b at the base time1.
As by construction these indices are measured relative to a constant base for all t and all i , they therefore capture differences in both the spatial and the temporal dimensions for any given firm at any given time.
As above, we define the economic profits of the base firm b at year 1, 
Given the binary definition of 
π can then be constructed with the underlying relative profitability indices, and can in fact be constructed as the ratio of either unit specific or spatial indices as defined in (5) and (6). This also clearly demonstrates that the catch up index is, at its core, simply a ratio of unit specific profitability growth rates. 
Moreover, by rearranging (7) and decomposing the profitability index we can write:
Thus, given the availability of relative performance indices, the temporal economic profitability of a firm i over time, π , e.g. profit performance of any firm can be decomposed into a measure capturing the profit change of a reference firm, and the given firm's performance change relative to that reference firm. Equation (8) therefore highlights the strong potential to apply this index based approach to regulatory settings where it is desirable to not only measure firm performance, but also to judge that performance relative to a base firm, normally defined as a "best practice" or "benchmark" firm. Equation (8) previously developed by Maziotis (2012a) lacks the impact of exogenous factors like quality in a profit decomposition analysis. Therefore, as is well documented in past studies (see Saal & Parker 2000 , Saal, Parker and Weyman-Jones, 2007 , Maziotis, Saal and Thanassoulis 2009 , the English and Welsh water and sewerage companies have been obliged to carry substantial capital investment projects in order to improve water and sewerage quality and environmental standards. Saal and Parker (2001) and Maziotis, Saal and Thanassoulis (2009) demonstrated that quality improvements do significantly impact temporal and spatial productivity and price performance estimates. Thus, we feel it is important to measure the impact of quality in our unit-specific, spatial and relative profitability, productivity and price performance measures, thereby allowing for the cross sectional and intertemporal variation in the sewage and drinking water quality.
We therefore calculate quality-adjusted measures of output, as the product of output and a quality index following the approach of Saal and Parker (2000) and (2001), Stone & Webster Consultants (2004) , Saal et al, (2007) , Maziotis, Saal and Thanassoulis (2009) . As a result, , quality is included in a profit decomposition approach as an exogenous factor and is intended to control for changes over the assesment period in water quality, environmental standards and characteristics that reflect differences between firms in terms of their operating environment (Stone & Webster Consultants, 2004) .
Once the quality adjusted water and sewerage outputs are constructed, quality adjusted indices are straightforward to produce, by first producing spatially consistent quality adjusted output indices (
). A spatial aggregate quality-adjusted aggregated output price index is then constructed as . , , , , ,
We can also derive a spatial implicit quality index (
Q , ) which measures the implied difference in quality relative to the base firm as .
, , , ,
Therefore, quality adjusted spatial outputs and output prices can also be respectively expressed as
, , = and
, which illustrate that the impact on spatial output quantities will be perfectly balanced by changes in spatial output prices. This also implies that measured spatial economic profitability (
π ) is not influenced by quality adjustment. In contrast, the impact of quality adjustment implies that quality adjusted spatial TFP can be expressed as
, , = and similarly, quality adjusted spatial price performance can be expressed as
, , / = and spatial economic profitability can be decomposed as,
In an analogous manner, we can derive measures of relative quality adjusted output indices over time,
and relative implicit quality index over time (
which measures the implied difference in quality over time relative to the base firm at the base period as
. Therefore, measures of quality adjusted relative outputs and output prices can also be expressed as
and
Thus, quality adjusted relative TFP and TPP over time can be expressed as
, whereas the relative economic profitability over time as .
, , , , ,
This also implies that measured relative economic profitability (
π ) is not influenced by quality adjustment. Also, we can produce measures of unit-specific quality adjusted output indices over time,
and implicit quality index over time (
US t i
Q , ) which measures the implied difference in unit-specific quality over time as
. Therefore, estimates of temporal quality adjusted outputs and output prices can also be expressed as
=
. Thus, the quality adjusted unit-specific TFP and TPP over time can be expressed as
, while the unit-specific economic profitability over time as .
As stated above, our adjustment of output prices and quantities for quality implies that any changes in the quality adjusted TPP index over time are balanced by an equivalent proportional change in the quality adjusted TFP index over time, thereby keeping the measurement of economic profitability unaffected by quality adjustment. We wish to emphasize that this is a reasonable assumption. Firstly, taking account of quality should not effect our underlying definition of economic profitability as turnover divided by economic costs. Secondly, it reflects the mathematical necessity that if turnover is constant, allowing for increases in output resulting from quality improvements, must result in a perfectly proportional reduction in output prices. Therefore, by adjusting TFP and TPP measures for quality keeping economic profitability unchanged, we are able to offer an alternative decomposition of unit-specific profitability growth, which will more properly attribute quality improvements to productivity improvement, rather than to over estimated improvements in price performance that would result from a quality-unadjusted measure. Moreover, as we will illustrate, this allows a further decomposition of equation (8) into the catch-up in quality regarding productivity and price performance achieved by less productivity firms and the quality growth in productivity and price performance of the base firm in a multilateral context.
Given the derivation of the spatial implicit output quality index (
Q , ) which measures the implied difference in quality relative to the base firm, we are able to construct measures of the catch-up in quality,
Q , , as a ratio of the spatial implicit quality index for any firm i to the base firm between year 1 and t,
Moreover, given the availability of 
Rearranging (9), we can express the unit-specific quality index of any firm i over time as a function of the catch-up in quality to the base firm and the quality improvement of the base firm,
Given our discussion of our approach to quality adjustment, the decomposition of firm specific economic profitability change detailed in (8) can now be extended, in the multilateral context, as follows: TFP   TPP  TPP  TFP  TFP  TPP  TFP   TPP  TPP  TFP  TFP   ,   ,   ,   ,  ,  ,  ,  ,   ,  ,   ,  ,   ,  ,   ,  ,   ,  , , ,
Thus, as in (8), in the first line of (8'), unit-specific economic profitability change, . Finally, the third line of (8') demonstrates the impact of quality in TFP and TPP measures over time. Thus, unit-specific economic profitability change,
be decomposed as a function of the quality unadjusted catch-up in productivity,
TFP , , the catch-up in quality regarding productivity, 
, then firm i improved its productivity or price performance relative to the base firm from year 1 to t, whereas a value lower than 1 indicates that productivity or price performance of firm i has declined relative to that of the base firm. If
, then the firm i improved its quality regarding productivity or price performance relative to the base firm from year 1 to year t, whereas a value lower than 1 indicates that relative quality regarding productivity or price performance of firm i has declined relative to that of the base firm.
Finally, the decomposition of the unit specific economic profitability over time in equation (8') can be visualized in Figure 1 . As adjustments for quality affect the productivity and price performance measures leaving the measured economic profitability unchanged, the unit-specific profitability growth can be expressed as a function of the unit-specific quality adjusted productivity and quality-adjusted price performance change. This can be further decomposed as a function of the quality adjusted catch-up in productivity, and the quality adjusted productivity growth of the benchmark firm, and the quality adjusted catch-up in price performance, and the quality adjusted price performance growth of the benchmark firm. The inclusion of quality in our analysis allows us to finally decompose unit-specific economic profitability change as a function of the quality unadjusted catch-up in productivity, the catch-up in quality regarding productivity, and the quality-unadjusted productivity and quality performance over time of the benchmark firm, and the quality unadjusted catch-up in price performance, the catch-up in quality regarding price performance, and the price performance and quality growth of the benchmark firm. Fisher input index, which takes the value 1 in the year 1 (base period):
Figure 1 Decomposition of Unit Specific Economic Profitability Change after Adjustments for Quality
A temporal Fisher productivity index can be used in the unchained form denoted above or in a chained form where weights are more closely matched to pair-wise comparisons of observations (Diewert & Lawrence, 2006 
The unit-specific productivity of a firm i over time can be similarly calculated as a chained index, although it can be equivalently calculated as a ratio of the chained unit-specific output and input indices over time, 
Given these chained unit-specific indexes, we can proceed to derive related TPP and Profitability indices as in Saal and Parker (2001) . To derive TPP index we firstly express unit-specific turnover at period t relative to the base year 1 as
The chained unit-specific aggregate output price index, ( ) 
Therefore, a chained unit-specific economic profitability index at period t relative to the base year 1 ,
π is calculated as the product of a chained index of unit-specific total factor productivity over time,
TFP , and a chained unit-specific index of total price performance over time,
Spatial Productivity, Price Performance and Profitability
In the previous section, we used a chained Fisher index to measure profitability, productivity and price performance of any firm between period 1 and period t. In this section, we derive a multilateral Fisher index to measure profitability, productivity and price performance across companies at any given year (multilateral spatial comparisons). When the price and quantities across different companies are compared, it is important that such comparisons are undertaken for every pair of companies being considered (multilateral comparisons). However, in order to achieve consistency between all the pairs of comparisons we need to derive multilateral indexes that fulfill the property of transitivity. Internal consistency (transitivity) implies that a direct comparison between two firms gives the same result when comparing indirectly these two firms through a third firm. Adopting the terminology of the price index literature (Hill, 2004) we refer to these multilateral output and input indices as spatial indices, as they provide spatially consistent measures across all firms.
The spatial total factor productivity Fisher index for a firm i relative to firm j , S j i TFP , , can then be constructed as the ratio of the spatial Fisher output index relative to spatial Fisher input index:
While we can generate the I I × possible transitive spatial output, input and productivity indexes between all firms, transitivity also implies that all meaningful information with regard to relative productivity is available in a subset of only I of these indices. Thus, if we arbitrarily choose one firm as a base firm and set b j = , then each spatial measure, is a measure of firm i relative to the chosen base firm and we can also simplify notation such that
. Therefore, productivity relative to the base firm's productivity can be expressed as:
However, this simplification comes at no loss of generality as another spatial productivity measure between any given firms can simply be calculated as
If spatial comparisons are available for each of T time periods indexed by t , and we assume the same base firm in all years, we can define the spatial productivity of firm i relative to firm b at time t as:
We now turn our discussion to the construction of the spatial total price performance index, ( ) 
Relative Productivity, Price Performance and Profitability Change Over Time
In order to simultaneously measure and decompose the profitability growth of any firm in the sample across time and relative to other firms, in practice it is necessary to reconcile the spatial profitability measures defined above with the underlying unit-specific chained profitability of each firm. This is because while section 2 has theoretically demonstrated that relative productivity measures can be expressed as a function of unit-specific and spatial productivity measures, this is not as straightforward in a multilateral empirical application. Thus, as demonstrated by Hill (2004) we cannot, in practice, derive multilateral measures of the productive change of any firm i relative to the base firm, which can satisfy both spatial and temporal consistency. [1] We have therefore chosen to pursue measures of relative productivity change over time that guarantee spatial consistency, as this approach is most consistent in the regulatory application we demonstrate below. Thus regulators in comparative or yard stick regulatory regimes typically employ cross section techniques to measure differences in productivity or efficiency across firms (relative comparative performance) and therefore use what are, in fact, spatial performance measures to inform their decision with regard to appropriate regulated prices. Thus, as our applied relative performance measures retain spatial consistency by construction, the relative performance indices will yield comparative performance measures that are consistent with regulatory practice in any given year. However, because our relative measures will also allow intertemporal analysis across firms, they have the advantage of allowing a more detailed analysis of firm performance change over time, which is not possible with a spatial index alone. . Given these arguments, we follow Hill's approach (2004) . Therefore, firm i's relative productivity change over time ( In order to achieve our ultimate goal of decomposing unit specific profit growth in the multilateral context, as demonstrated in (8) Given our modeling decision to maintain spatial consistency at the cost of temporal consistency, and the subsequent employment of the geometric average of the I alternative potential relative indicators as appropriate unit specific relative productivity, output and input indices, we must note that the unit-specific chained temporal indexes will, by construction, not be perfectly consistent with the unit specific temporal indexes constructed from the multilateral relative indices.
Nevertheless, it can be readily mathematically demonstrated that the geometric average of the I chained unit specific temporal indices and those derived from the relative indices detailed in equations (25) and (26) . This implies that while our approach to deriving the relative indicators necessary to decompose unit-specific trends in firm performance can result in minor deviations from the temporal trends implied by the unit-specific chained indices, we can nonetheless be fully confident that on average, the unit specific estimates are consistent with the underlying chain-based estimates of temporal change in firm performance. We therefore, focus on these average estimates and their decomposition in our results below.
This section has specified a methodology to allow the empirical application of unit-specific, spatial and relative economic profitability indices and their decomposition into unit-specific, spatial and relative productivity and price performance indices in a multilateral setting by reconciling together temporal chained and spatial indices, following Hill's approach (2004) . Moreover, we have demonstrated that these estimates are not only spatially consistent, but are also, on average, consistent with alternative unit-specific chained indices of temporal performance change. Thus, this section has demonstrated an appropriate methodology to allow for decompositions of profitability indices in a multilateral setting, thereby extending the approach illustrated in equations (1), (2) and (3) in the binary context. Consequently, we are able to consistently decompose unit specific profitability change as a function of the profitability growth of a base firm and profitability catchup relative to that firm over time, which can be further decomposed as a function of the productivity and price performance of a base firm and productivity and price performance catch-up relative to that firm over time, in a multilateral setting, as illustrated in equation (8) in the binary context. Finally, it can be easily proven that by adjusting output with quality we can also extend equation (8') in a multilateral setting. We subsequently employed a user-cost of capital approach, to calculate total capital costs as the sum of the opportunity cost of invested capital and capital depreciation relative to the MEA asset values, and construct the price of physical capital as the user cost of capital divided by the above MEA based measure of physical capital stocks. The opportunity cost of capital is defined as the product of the weighted average cost of capital (WACC) before tax and the companies' average Regulatory Capital Value (RCV). The RCV is the financial measure of capital stock accepted by Ofwat for regulatory purposes. The WACC calculation is broadly consistent with Ofwat's regulatory assumptions and is estimated with the risk free return assumed to be the average annual yields of medium-term UK inflation indexed gilts. The risk premium for company equity and corporate debt was assumed to be 2% following Ofwat's approach at past price reviews. We also allowed for differences in company gearing ratios and effective corporate tax rates, which were calculated as the sum of aggregate current and deferred tax divided by the aggregate current cost profit before taxation. Finally, following the approach in Ofwat's regulatory current cost accounts, capital depreciation was the sum of current cost depreciation and infrastructure renewals charge.
Data
The average number of full-time equivalent (FTE) employees is available from the companies' statutory accounts. Firm specific labour prices were calculated as the ratio of total labour costs to the average number of full-time equivalent employees. Other costs in nominal terms were defined as the difference between operating costs and total labour costs [2] . Given the absence of data allowing a more refined break out of other costs, we employ the UK price index for materials and fuel purchased in purification and distribution of water, as the price index for other costs, and simply deflate nominal other costs by this measure to obtain a proxy for real usage of other inputs. Given these input quantity and price measures, we are able to calculate indices of unit-specific, spatial and relative input usage discussed above. As total nominal economic costs are obtained as the sum of total capital costs, labour costs and other costs in nominal terms, division of this sum by the unit-specific, spatial and relative input index, allows the construction of unit-specific, spatial and relative input price indices. Finally, economic profits are calculated as the difference between turnover and calculated economic costs.
Following Saal and Parker (2001) the drinking water quality index is calculated as the ratio of the average percentage of each WaSC's water supply zones that are fully compliant with key water quality parameters, relative to the average compliance percentage for England and Wales in 1991. Water supply zones are areas designated by the water companies by reference to a source of supply in which not more than 50,000 people reside. The data were drawn from the DWI's annual reports for drinking water quality for the calendar years ending 1991-2007 [3] . The drinking water quality can be defined either based on the sixteen water quality parameters or nine water quality parameters identified as being important for aesthetic, health reasons and cost reasons or based on based on the six water quality parameters identified as being indicative of how well treatment works and distribution systems are operated and maintained. Due to changes in some of the drinking water quality standards and the new regulations, the DWI report for 2005 no longer included the two quality indices that compared companies' compliance for the sixteen or nine water quality parameters with the average for England and Wales. So we decided to report results for the drinking water quality based on the six water quality parameters
[4] that Ofwat also employs in his assessment and reflect how well treatment works and distribution systems are operated and maintained (Ofwat, 2006) .
The sewage treatment quality index is defined as a weighted index of the percentage of connected population for which sewage receives primary treatment and the percentage of population for which sewage receives at least secondary treatment.
It also implicitly includes the percentage of connected population for which sewage is not treated with a zero weight. This data choice reflects both the availability of consistent data capturing quality trends for the entire 1991-2008 period, and does clearly capture substantial increases in sewage treatment levels, particularly in the earlier part of the sample period. The sewage treatment data were taken from Waterfacts for the first years 1990-91 to 1995-96 and the companies' regulatory returns for the fiscal years 1996-97 to 2007-08. Moreover, we henceforward refer to data based on the ending year of the fiscal years.
It is clearly necessary to employ a weighted index of these measures as both the quality and costs of higher treatment levels exceed those associated with non treatment or primary treatment alone. We therefore endeavoured to construct a cost based weighting system, although the necessary data to accomplish this was relatively limited. However, we were able to calculate relative cost measures based on the ratio of sewerage treatment costs to volumes of sewerage treatment, using two alternative cost estimates available from company regulatory returns. One of these alternative estimates was based on total sewerage treatment functional expenditure and direct costs for all treatment works, while the other was based on total sewage treatment costs for large treatment works only. These estimates suggest that higher levels of treatment are 1.68 to 2.40 times more costly than primary treatment only. Given this estimate range, we chose to weight the percentage of population receiving secondary treatment of sewage or more twice as much as the percentage receiving primary treatment only. While admittedly, somewhat ad hoc, we emphasize there is some empirical evidence to support these weights. We note that it is straightforward to demonstrate that the resulting weighted quality index is nested between an index based solely on the percentage of population receiving at least primary sewage treatment, which would underestimate gains in sewage treatment quality, and one based solely on the percentage of population receiving at least secondary sewage treatment, which would overestimate gains in sewage treatment quality.
Results from productivity, price performance and profitability after controlling for quality
The above spatial and relative profitability, productivity and price performance measures were defined relative to the base firm in the sample. However, if the base firm is defined as the firm with the highest productivity in the sample, then each firm's productivity, prices and profits will be relative to this best practice or benchmark firm [5] . In this section we first report geometric average measures of unit-specific profitability, productivity and price performance. Consequently, we decompose theses changes into an average catch-up component and the performance of the benchmark firm as illustrated in equation (8). Figure 2 illustrates the decomposition of unit-specific economic profitability change into quality adjusted unit-specific productivity and price performance change over the period 1991-2008. The results indicate that between 1991 and 2008, average economic profitability increased by 5.9%, which was attributed to a significant improvement in TFP of 51.7% and a reduction in TPP of 30.2%. On average there was a stable and substantial increase in TFP over time, while TPP followed an upward trend until 1994, which was interrupted in 1995, but was again followed by a substantial increase between 1999 and 2000. We note that during the years 1991-1995, average economic profitability increased due to increases in TPP which was substantially greater than TFP growth. As documented in previous studies, Ofwat's tightening of price caps in the 1994 price review decreased the growth in real output prices and therefore resulted in a downward trend for both TPP and economic profitability until 1998, while TFP continued to improve significantly. After 2000, reduced output prices caused TPP to dramatically decline, and its value remained consistently below 1 after 2000. This indicates that regulatory price changes implemented after 2000 caused the price performance of firms to fall substantially below its level in 1991. Moreover, average unit-specific TPP followed a downward trend except for 2006, when output prices were allowed to momentarily rise in the first year of the 2006-10 regulatory period. Unsurprisingly, given the dramatic fall in price performance after 2000, average economic profitability also substantially declined, even if TFP continued to follow a steady upward trend, which was only momentarily interrupted in 2007. Thus, in the post 2000 period, trends in temporal economic profitability followed the trend of TPP, indicating that changes in price performance were a significant determinant of changes in economic profitability. 698 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 small improvements in quality and thus, small changes in the quality adjusted TFP growth rate, whereas in the last two years of our study average quality followed a slightly decline trend. Nevertheless productivity still continued to improve in this later period, suggesting that firms were able to achieve productivity improvements by reducing input usage. 234 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 TPP change into quality unadjusted average TPP change and quality change. Since output prices are adjusted for quality as we discussed in section 2, on average the magnitude of change in quality adjusted TPP must exceed that of quality unadjusted TPP. We would therefore emphasize that the quality adjusted TPP index must also follow the general trend of the quality-unadjusted index, but it also must demonstrate a more significant decline in price performance, as it allows for the output enhancing impact of quality improvements. During the lax price cap period 1991-1994, increases in quality unadjusted TPP exceeded the quality adjusted TPP implying that increases in output prices were greater than the quality adjusted output prices. This upward trend was interrupted in 1995 followed by a downward trend until 1998, whereas looser price caps were introduced. We note that after 1998, on average quality adjusted TPP took a value lower than 1 implying that after controlling for quality the reduction in quality adjusted output prices was greater than the quality unadjusted output prices and therefore, relative to 1991, by 2008 average quality adjusted TPP reduced by 30.2%, whereas average quality unadjusted TPP declined by 13.9%, implying that the impact of average quality in output prices and therefore in average TPP was approximately 19%. Thus, Figure 4 clearly suggests that, while quality improvements have contributed to the productivity performance of the WaSCs, they have also contributed negatively to their price performance. 810 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 The decomposition of quality adjusted average unit-specific productivity growth into the quality adjusted productivity growth of the benchmark firm and average quality adjusted productivity catch-up is depicted in Figure 5 . The figure clearly illustrates that until 1994 there were small or no catch up gains in qualityadjusted productivity by the average company since its productivity improved by 6.7%, while the benchmark company improved its productivity by 7.1%. In contrast, Unit-Specific 1.0001.011 1.0461. 0671.0861.1191.1561.1971.2361.2541.3701.4011.4241.4421.4931.5161.5011.517 Catch-Up 1.0001.006 1.0000. 9961.0071.0131.0631.0411.0611.0881.1791 9961.0071.0131.0631.0411.0611.0881. .1951 9961.0071.0131.0631.0411.0611.0881. .2081 9961.0071.0131.0631.0411.0611.0881. .2021 9961.0071.0131.0631.0411.0611.0881. .2321 9961.0071.0131.0631.0411.0611.0881. .1991 9961.0071.0131.0631.0411.0611.0881. .1991 9961.0071.0131.0631.0411.0611.0881. .233 Best 1.0001.005 1.0461.0711.0791.1041 9961.0071.0131.0631.0411.0611.0881. .0881.1501 9961.0071.0131.0631.0411.0611.0881. .1641 9961.0071.0131.0631.0411.0611.0881. .1531 9961.0071.0131.0631.0411.0611.0881. .1621 9961.0071.0131.0631.0411.0611.0881. .1721 9961.0071.0131.0631.0411.0611.0881. .1791 9961.0071.0131.0631.0411.0611.0881. .1991 9961.0071.0131.0631.0411.0611.0881. .2111 9961.0071.0131.0631.0411.0611.0881. .2651 9961.0071.0131.0631.0411.0611.0881. .2521 9961.0071.0131.0631.0411.0611.0881. .230 1991 9961.0071.0131.0631.0411.0611.0881. 1992 9961.0071.0131.0631.0411.0611.0881. 1993 9961.0071.0131.0631.0411.0611.0881. 1994 9961.0071.0131.0631.0411.0611.0881. 1995 9961.0071.0131.0631.0411.0611.0881. 1996 9961.0071.0131.0631.0411.0611.0881. 1997 9961.0071.0131.0631.0411.0611.0881. 1998 9961.0071.0131.0631.0411.0611.0881. 1999 9961.0071.0131.0631.0411.0611.0881. 2000 9961.0071.0131.0631.0411.0611.0881. 2001 9961.0071.0131.0631.0411.0611.0881. 2002 9961.0071.0131.0631.0411.0611.0881. 2003 9961.0071.0131.0631.0411.0611.0881. 2004 9961.0071.0131.0631.0411.0611.0881. 2005 9961.0071.0131.0631.0411.0611.0881. 2006 9961.0071.0131.0631.0411.0611.0881. 2007 9961.0071.0131.0631.0411.0611.0881. 2008 The decomposition of quality adjusted average unit-specific TPP growth into the quality adjusted TPP growth of the benchmark firm and average quality adjusted TPP catch-up to the benchmark firm over time is depicted in Figure 6 . Until 1994, quality adjusted average TPP growth exceeded benchmark TPP growth allowing an average catch-up in price performance of 3.6%. The tightened 1994 price review resulted in a substantial downward trend in quality adjusted average and benchmark TPP during the years 1996-1998, which was interrupted in 1999. We note that after 1995 and until the end of the period of study, quality adjusted benchmark TPP always Our results therefore suggest that when quality is taken into account in TPP measures, the broad convergence after 2000 between average and benchmark firm price performance which was observed in the quality unadjusted TPP results in Figure 6 .6
is no longer present. Stated differently, when quality is taken into account, an average firm saw its price performance decline relative to the benchmark by 12.3% between 1991 and 2008 as benchmark quality adjusted benchmark TPP declined by only 20.4% while average TPP showed a higher reduction of 31.2%. 1230.8890.9560.9020.8630.8280.8820.8320.796 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Finally, Figure 7 shows the decomposition of average unit-specific quality change into average quality catch-up relative to the benchmark firm and the quality change of the benchmark firm, as illustrated in the third line of equation (8' however, it showed a significant decline in 2007 and in 2008 which affected the quality adjusted TFP growth rates, whereas benchmark quality followed a stable slow upward trend. We need to emphasize that the small quality growth of the benchmark firm did not imply that the benchmark did not achieve significant quality levels. In contrast, our results suggest that at privatization the quality standards of the benchmark firm had already been at a high level and by 2005 on average the less productive firms had significantly improved their quality relative to the benchmark and had finally reached the higher levels of quality of the benchmark firm. Given the considerable cost of these quality improvements, figure 7 illustrates the importance of controlling for quality changes if we wish to properly gauge relative productivity, price, profitability, and catch up performance. 048 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 unit-specific profitability change was also expressed as a function of the unit-specific quality adjusted productivity and quality-adjusted price performance change. This was further decomposed as a function of the quality adjusted catch-up in productivity, and the quality adjusted productivity growth of the benchmark firm, and the quality adjusted catch-up in price performance, and the quality adjusted price performance growth of the benchmark firm. The inclusion of quality in our analysis allowed us to eventually decompose unit-specific economic profitability change as a function of the quality unadjusted catch-up in productivity, the catch-up in quality, and the qualityunadjusted productivity and quality performance over time of the benchmark firm, and the quality unadjusted catch-up in price performance, the catch-up in quality regarding price performance, and the price performance and quality growth of the benchmark firm, in a binary and multilateral context.
The results indicated that while quality improvements have contributed to the productivity performance of the WaSCs, they have also contributed negatively to their price performance. The quality adjusted TFP results indicated that although average productivity slightly exceeded benchmark productivity until 1995, the rate of quality adjusted productivity growth for the average and benchmark firms was significantly greater than the quality unadjusted TFP indicating that quality improvements did lead to higher productivity growths. After 1997 and until 2002, average quality adjusted TFP increased more rapidly than benchmark quality adjusted TFP, therefore allowing average company to catch-up to benchmark quality adjusted productivity. to the benchmark which already had high levels of quality since privatization.
Moreover, the quality adjusted TPP results suggested that until 1994, average TPP exceeded benchmark TPP but after 1998, there was a steady erosion of average price performance relative to benchmark price performance suggesting that there was a considerable rebalancing of regulatory price decisions in favour of the benchmark firm, which was even more dramatically extended with the implementation of the 1999 price review in 2001. The dramatic fall in both average and benchmark quality adjusted TPP suggested that that both the 1994 and 1999 price reviews resulted in considerable movement to a regulatory price cap system consistent with a yardstick regulation regime. We would moreover offer the suggestion that this better alignment Overall, our index number based approach provided a backward-looking approach regarding the impact of price cap regulation on the profitability, productivity and price performance of less productive and benchmark firms even if the number of available observations was extremely limited. We strongly believe that our methodology can be of great aid for regulators in setting X-factors under price cap regulation for regulated firms (forward-looking). Since X-factor requires the measurement of efficiency change (catch-up) and frontier shift (technical change), our approach provides evidence for catch-up (efficiency) in productivity by less productive firms based on the consistent spatial productivity measures across companies at any given year and also provides evidence for the productivity growth of the benchmark firm (technical change).
Notes
1. Spatially consistency implies that each year's relative productivity measures do not depend on the other years in the comparison and temporal consistency implies that each firm's productivity estimates do not depend on the number of observations in the time series.
2. While it would be particularly desirable to disaggregate other input usage data further and in particular to allow for separate energy and chemical usage inputs, the data available at company level from Ofwat's regulatory return does not allow a further meaningful decomposition of other input usage.
3. The DWI provides quality data based on calendar years, while all other information employed in this paper is based on fiscal years ending March 31 st . We note this inconsistency in the data, but emphasize that the reported years overlap each other for 9 months. Thus, the year end to year end estimates of quality change obtained from the DWI data provide consistent estimates of quality change by the water companies, at a fixed point 9 months into each fiscal year.
4. The six water quality parameters, which form the Operational Performance Index (OPI) are iron, manganese, aluminium, turbidity, faecal coliforms and trihalomethanes. The resulting drinking water quality index suggests an increase in quality of 10.3 percent between 1991 and 2008 after aggregating the data for all WaSCs.
5. We have not identified firms for confidentially reasons. The same firm is consistently found to have the highest spatial productivity estimates in all years, and is therefore modelled as the benchmark most productive firm in each year of our study Moreover, we note that his same firm was found to have the highest spatial productivity estimates in each year of the study regardless of whether we applied the spatially consistent Fisher indices provided in the main text, similar spatially consistent Tornqvist indices, or the multilateral translog index for WaSCs based on the Tornqvist index developed by Caves et al (1982a) . Furthermore, there is little substantive difference between the results regardless of which method is employed.
